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The working of the”asset currency” provided by the Swedish note banking 
system in 1878–1901 is described. Natural and institutional conditions 
caused the demand for currency to peak in March and September, with 
troughs in July and January. The paper investigates how the Enskilda 
banks provided liquidity to solve the problem. This is done by describing 
how the volume of notes varied over the year, and how other balance sheet 
items co-moved with them. Strong seasonal co-variation is found particu-
larly between lending and foreign payments media, varying like commu-
nicating vessels over the sailing season in May–October (when the sea was 
ice free and shipments were made). 
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1  Introduction  
Modern central banks largely emerged as a means to provide 
liquidity in times of crises. In the 19th century liquidity crises 
were common, with bank runs and panics. Received wisdom 
holds that they ended when central banks acting as lenders 
of last resort were set up. Yet it can be argued that the crises 
were actually caused by legal restrictions that hindered 
banks from responding to increased demands for currency – 
if the restrictions had not been there in the first place there 
would have been no need for a lender of last resort.  
Liquidity crises were most famously a problem in Eng-
land and in the United States. In England, the Peel’s Act im-
posed a 100 percent marginal gold reserve requirement on 
Bank of England notes, which created an inelastic note stock 
unable to accommodate increased demands for currency in 
1847, 1857 and 1866, when runs and panics occurred. From 
these events the Bank of England eventually evolved into 
becoming a central bank-lender of last resort, in the spirit of 
Bagehot (1873). Likewise, in the United States the 110 per-
cent bond collateral requirement on National Bank notes 
created an inelastic note stock unable to meet peak demands 
for currency, for example in the falls during “crop moving 
season”. The Federal Reserve System was created in 1913 
with the set purpose to “furnish an elastic currency” (Miron 
1986). In particular, the new central bank was expected to 
provide much needed “form-seasonal” elasticity to the 
money stock, that is, a money stock that was able to change 
form seasonally (from deposits into notes), particularly in 




In the United States some reformers pushed for what 
they called an asset currency (Selgin and White 1994). To 
provide an elastic currency, the National Banks should be 
allowed to back their notes with any assets they saw fit. As-
set currency reformers looked to Canada as the model to 
emulate. Canadian banks did not suffer from runs and pan-
ics. Since Canadian banks were not subject to binding legal 
restrictions, they could expand and contract their note issues 
with the “needs of trade”, particularly in October.  
Since central banks were largely set up to provide liquid-
ity in times of need, the alternative – unrestricted note bank-
ing systems able to provide “asset currencies” – should be of 
interest. The last two decades have seen an increased interest 
in the experience of “free banking”. Banks in these systems 
did not face binding legal restrictions on entry, size and 
branching, and particularly on their issuing of notes. The 
new research has modified the previously negative assess-
ments of competitive note banking regimes. Dowd (1992) 
documents about sixty instances of free banking. Most of 
them occurred in the British dominions. Many other coun-
tries, for example Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Ger-
many, had experience with free banking in the nineteenth 
century, but during relatively brief periods of time. In view 
of the combination of country size, freedom of systems, and 
length of experience, the most important instances were ar-
guably Scotland, Canada and Sweden. However, until now 
there are no quantitative studies of how these historical “as-
set currencies” really worked. That is: how exactly were the 
banks able to provide liquidity and accommodate the “needs 
of trade”? Selgin and White (1994) show how elastic the Ca-




but do not cover what happened with the rest of the balance 
sheet. Scottish free banking ended already in 1845 – finding 
good bank data for the Scottish free banking period may be 
difficult.  
Therefore the Swedish experience is of interest. Between 
1831 and 1904, commercial banks called Enskilda banks is-
sued notes. About twenty-five Enskilda banks competed 
with the Bank of Sweden, until this bank gained a note mo-
nopoly in 1901–1904. From 1878 monthly data from the 
banks’ balance sheets have been collected, with detailed in-
formation on balance sheet items. The purpose of this paper 
is to use this data to provide a quantitative examination of 
the workings of the asset currency provided by the Swedish 
note banking system in 1880–1901.1 The focal question is this:  
What was the liquidity problem of the Swedish econ-
omy in the late 19th century, and how did the En-
skilda banks act in order to solve it?  
The answer is given by investigating the seasonal variation 
in the stock of bank notes, and how other balance sheet items 
co-moved with them.  
The monthly data used have previously not been pre-
sented. To my knowledge this is the first quantitative exami-
                                                      
1 Although much research has been done on Swedish banking in 
the nineteenth century, not much has been done from the free 
banking perspective. Jonung (1989) and Lakomaa (2004) give com-
prehensive accounts of the free banking question in Sweden 1830–
1903, with focus on the institutional setup and the debates. Ögren 
(2003) investigates long run trends in money and credit supply 
during the whole period with note issuing banks 1834-1913, but 




nation of the inner workings behind the (seasonal) provision 
of liquidity in an unrestricted note banking system. Ögren 
(2003) also studies the provision of liquidity in the Swedish 
note banking system in the 19th century, but with end-of-year 
data, and with focus on long-term trends.  
2  Preliminaries  
This section reviews three preliminary issues. First, the li-
quidity problem faced by the Swedish economy in late 19th 
century is addressed. Second, the institutional background is 
reviewed. Third, the methodology used to estimate seasonal 
variation is discussed.  
2.1 The liquidity problem  
In the 19th century, the annual variations in the demand for 
currency were larger than they are today. Currency was the 
dominant medium of payment. Transactions were concen-
trated to specific times of the year, when currency demand 
peaked. Two great peaks were set by the forces of nature. 
Like in other countries, most people worked in agriculture, 
and payment media were needed during “crop-moving sea-
son”, in harvest-time, in September–October.  Then there 
were the needs of industry and forestry, which were con-
strained by ”the sailing season”. Because the sea was frozen, 
there was no shipping of goods in the winter period. The 
sailing season, when the sea was open and exports and im-
ports were made, lasted from May to October. This condition 
created a liquidity problem for the exporting industry, since 
they could not receive payment for their products before the 




for inputs. André Oscar Wallenberg, the founder of the 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, the most important note-issuing 
commercial bank, wrote that 
Twice a year the quantity of outstanding notes rise, 
namely in September–October, when they reach 
their maximum, due to the needs of agriculture for 
transactions media to pay for the costs of gathering 
the harvest, and in March, when the last debentures 
are extended to the industry before shipment starts. 
Minimum occurs in July, before harvest. (Wallen-
berg 1886, p. 25)  
In addition to the nature-generated seasonal effects on cur-
rency demand, there were those generated by institutional 
conditions. Traditionally, the “legal moving days” (lagliga 
fardagar) were days when many contracts were made and 
paid. The legal moving day for land leases (jordarrenden) was 
the 14th of March. Rental contracts expired on the 1st of April 
and on the 1st of October. The moving day for servants was 
the 24th of October, and in Stockholm also the 24th of April. 
Taxes were paid in June and December. Many companies 
also paid dividends in June and December.   
2.2 Institutional background 
Two types of banks issued bank notes. Enskilda banks (Private 
banks) were chartered commercial banks with unlimited 
liability. The Bank of Sweden was the bank of the parliament, 
which also acted as a commercial bank. The constitution of 
1809 granted legal tender status to the notes of the Bank of 




comprised of the Aktiebolagsbanker (Joint Stock banks), which 
had limited liability but did not issue notes. 
The Enskilda banks were regulated by the Bank Law of 
1874. The law stated cash and capital requirements that were 
linked to the note-issuing rights. To be allowed to issue 
notes, an Enskilda bank had to hold gold reserves amount-
ing to at least 10 percent of paid-in capital. Enskilda bank 
notes were to be redeemed into gold coin only. Outstanding 
notes could not exceed the sum of the bank’s holdings of: 
Collateral for equity; Claims up to fifty percent of paid-in 
capital; and Gold exceeding ten percent of paid-in capital 
(SFS 74:44).  
In addition to the quantitative rules, the Enskilda banks 
faced other restrictions. From 1880 Enskilda banks were not 
allowed to issue five-crown notes, which became a monop-
oly of the Bank of Sweden. This restriction was important, 
since small notes were more popular and circulated longer. 
The loss of the five-crown notes was partly compensated by 
an increased circulation of ten-crown notes. Wallenberg 
(1886, p. 19) claims that the Enskilda  banks were able to 
compensate two thirds of their loss of five-crown notes by 
issuing ten-crown notes. Another restriction was that the 
Enskilda bank notes were taxed by 0.5 percent, calculated on 
the highest circulation during the year. 
The note-issuing right of the Bank of Sweden was sim-
pler. The bank was allowed to issue notes up to its reserves 
(specie + foreign exchange) plus a stipulated quantity. Dur-
ing the note competition period this quantity did not alter 
much: in 1879–1887 it was 35 million, and in 1888–1898 it 
was 45 million. By contrast, after note monopolisation it rose 




The clearing function of the Swedish banking system 
was peculiar, in that it was performed by two commercial 
banks. In 1856 the Stockholms Enskilda Bank was started. It 
immediately began to act as a clearing bank for other note-
issuing banks. However, the Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebo-
laget, a non-issuing bank, largely took over the clearing func-
tion in the 1860s, mainly because it offered better terms. 
There were thus two clearing banks in the period 1878–1901, 
one of which did not issue notes.  
In 1897 a new bank law was promulgated that pre-
scribed the monopolisation of notes by the Bank of Sweden. 
The transfer of the Enskilda banks notes to the Bank of Swe-
den occurred between January 1901 and January 1904. Clear-
ing was now also taken over by the Bank of Sweden. After 
monopolisation, commercial banks acquired notes mainly by 
rediscounting bills with the Bank of Sweden.  
Was the Swedish note banking system free from interven-
tion?  
In 1878–1879 a severe crisis hit the Swedish economy. A 
boom, fueled by railroad construction and international de-
mand for Swedish iron and timber, turned into a bust when 
prices fell. The Stockholms Enskilda Bank had invested 
heavily in railroad bonds. This bank was also more lever-
aged than other banks – while capital-asset ratios of other 
banks were around 20 percent, the Stockholms Enskilda 
Bank was operating on a ratio around 10 percent (Summary 
of the Bank Reports). When two ironworks that the Stock-
holms Enskilda Bank was heavily invested in suspended 
payments, rumours spread that the bank would become in-




holms Enskilda Bank. In February 1879, the finance minister 
Hans Forsell made pronouncements that government sup-
port to the banks would relieve capital markets. In May 1879, 
a special fund called the Railroad Mortgage Fund was cre-
ated, administered by the National Debt Office, from which 
banks could borrow on railroad bonds as security (Lindgren 
1994).  
This incident, it can been argued, shows that the Swed-
ish note banking system was not able to stand on its own 
without the government intervening and acting as a lender 
of a last resort. However, this reading is open to debate. It is 
important to remember that when the government assumes 
a role as guarantor of the solvency of the banking system, it 
does not act as a lender of last resort. The classical lender of 
last resort provides liquidity to all illiquid but solvent banks, 
in order to quench bank runs and panics. By contrast, the 
activities of the Swedish government in 1879 was very much 
about saving one important possibly insolvent bank from 
bankruptcy, in order to avoid larger damage to the financial 
system. Apart from the Stockholms Enskilda Bank, banks 
made marginal use of the fund.2 The Swedish situation in 
1878–1879 was clearly different from the general panics that 
hit England in 1847, 1857 and 1866, when lender of last re-
sort-response was called for. Apart from limited runs on the 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, other banks were not subject to 
runs or panics. The difficulties of the Stockholms Enskilda 
Bank did not spill over into a general distrust of the banking 
                                                      
2 From a total of 42 commercial banks, 13 made use of the fund. Of 
the 7.56 million lent, over half (4 million) was borrowed by the 




system. There is also evidence that bank support for the fund 
was lukewarm – with the exception of the Stockholms En-
skilda Bank, banks did not see themselves in trouble and the 
fund was therefore not felt to be necessary (Nilsson 1994, p. 
288). In sum, it is not clear what contribution the govern-
ment intervention made to relieve the crisis, and it is con-
ceivable that the banks would have weathered the storm 
without it.  
2.3 Methodology  
Seasonal (monthly) averages for balance sheet items were 
estimated by maximum-likelihood on logged series, with 
monthly dummies, and four lags as independent variables. 
The strategy was to test for stationarity by means of the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots. For variables 
deemed stationary, seasonal coefficients were estimated by 
regression on levels.3 In case of non-stationarity, differenced 
variables were used.4 To estimate the significance of the sea-
sonal variation (monthly changes), p-values for the regres-
sion coefficients were used in the case of differenced vari-
ables. In the case of level-variables, Wald tests on the equal-
ity of subsequent regression coefficients were performed. 
Regression and test results are available upon request. Re-
gression specifications are shown in the Appendix.  
Seasonal averages were estimated on a sample from 
January 1880 to January 1896. This period was chosen be-
cause  ceteris paribus conditions were then fairly present. 
                                                      
3 Enskilda Bank Notes, Bank of Sweden Notes, Post Bills, Cash.  
4 Liquid Claims, Bills, Foreign Bills, Cash Credit, Loans, Loans on 




Variables were fairly stationary (an international monetary 
expansion started in 1896 which also affected Sweden). Also, 
the period 1878–1879 saw financial turbulence, and the En-
skilda banks lost the right to issue five-crown notes. Institu-
tional changes also occurred in 1897 with the promulgation 
of the new bank law.  
3  The note circulation 
This section describes the annual and seasonal variation in 
the note stocks of the Enskilda banks and the Bank of Swe-
den, 1878–1901. Figure 1 depicts the behaviour of the En-
skilda bank notes.    
  Figure 1 Enskilda bank notes, 1878–1901 (kSEK).  
 
  Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
The note stock seems to move with remarkable seasonal 
regularity. An exception is perhaps in 1878–1880. There was 
an industrial crisis in 1878–79. Also, in January 1880 the En-











2 displays seasonal (monthly) averages for the note stock in 
1880–1895. Levels have been normalised to show each 
month’s average note circulation as a ratio of the average 
(monthly) circulation over the year.  
Figure 2 Average seasonal note stocks of the Swedish Enskilda 
banks, 1880–1895.  
 
  ∆  p 
Jan  –0.063  0.000 
Feb  0.018  0.004 
Mar  0.071  0.000 
Apr  –0.038  0.000 
May  –0.031  0.000 
Jun  0.025  0.000 
Jul  –0.079  0.000 
Aug  0.014  0.028 
Sep  0.14  0.000 
Oct  –0.008  0.12 
Nov  –0.044  0.000 
Dec  –0.006  0.23   
  Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Demand for notes peaked twice a year, namely in March and 
in September–October. The biggest troughs were in July and 
in January. The expansion between August and September is 
most conspicuous. Then the note stock expanded by about 
14 percent. A. O. Wallenberg’s description of the seasonal 
fluctuations quoted above corresponds exactly to the pattern 
in Figure 2. His comment suggests that the peak in March 
was related to the needs of industry, whereas the peak in 
September–October was related to the needs of agriculture. 
Figure 2 also indicates that the seasonal changes are statisti-
cally significant (except for the small contractions in October 








The note stock of the Bank of Sweden  
The note stock of the Bank of Sweden exhibited a seasonal 
pattern distinct from that of the Enskilda banks. This is seen 
in Figure 3.  
Figure 3 Note stock of Bank of Sweden 1878–1901 (kSEK) . 
 
  Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Figure 4 pictures the average seasonal note stock of Bank of 











Figure 4 Average seasonal note stocks of the Bank of Sweden,  
1880–1895.  
 
  ∆  p 
Jan  –0.054  0.000 
Feb  –0.006  0.53 
Mar  0.018  0.038 
Apr  –0.044  0.000 
May  0.072  0.000 
Jun  0.046  0.001 
Jul  –0.091  0.000 
Aug  0.032  0.006 
Sep  0.044  0.004 
Oct  –0.057  0.000 
Nov  0.033  0.006 
Dec  0.009  0.51   
   Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Whereas for the Enskilda banks, the highest peaks occurred 
in March and September, the notes of the Bank of Sweden 
peaked in June, September and (to a lesser extent) December. 
Also, whereas the Enskilda bank notes had their lowest cir-
culation in July, the Bank of Sweden notes bottomed out in 
April. Potential causes to the difference have been sketched 
above. In March the last debentures to the industry before 
shipment were extended, which increased the demand rela-
tively more for Enskilda bank notes. The Enskilda banks’ 
main task was to provide for the financial needs of the in-
dustry, which was not the case with the Bank of Sweden. On 
the other hand, many companies paid dividends twice a 
year, at the end of December and June, when taxes were also 
paid. These transactions were possibly mostly paid in Bank 








4  Assets of the Swedish asset currency  
This section describes the balance sheet of the Enskilda 
banks, and how its components changed in relation to the 
note stock. Three questions are addressed:  
1. Which items were overall most strongly correlated 
with the note stock?  
2. Which items correlated with the note stock in the 
months of the greatest expansion and contraction, 
namely in March and September, July and January?  
3. What was the proportion between quantitative and 
qualitative (or form-seasonal) changes in money de-
mand, that is, how much of the change in note demand 
was due to a change in the total demand for money, and 
how much was due to a change in the currency-deposit 
ratio – particularly in September?  
Table 1 shows the aggregated balance sheet of the Enskilda 
banks in December 1890, in the middle of the studied period.  
Table 1 Aggregated balance sheet of the Enskilda banks,  
December 1890 (MSEK).  
Assets 441  Liabilities  441 
Cash 12  Post  Bills    11 
Liquid claims  32  Notes  59 
Bonds  31  Demand Deposits     40 
Bills 142  Time  Deposits  222 
Loans 95  Equity  72 
Cash Credit  51  Other  38 
Other 78     




On the liabilities side, demand liabilities were about 110 mil-
lion (post bills, notes and demand deposits). Notes were lar-
ger than demand deposits. The cash-to-demand liabilities 
ratio was about 10 percent, while the liquidity ratio –  (liquid 
claims + cash)-to-demand liabilities – was about 40 percent. 
On the assets side, bills were the dominant form of credit. 
Lending (domestic bills, loans, and cash credit) was about 
280 million, somewhat larger than deposits, 260 million. Ta-
ble 2 depicts correlations between monthly changes in bal-
ance sheet items and the note stock in 1880–1895.  
Table 2 Correlations between monthly changes in Enskilda 
bank notes and balance sheet items, 1880–1895.  
Assets Liabilities 
Cash  0.19  Post Bills   0.58 
Liquid claims  0.36  Demand Deposits  –0.33 
Bonds 0.08  Time  Deposits  –0.40 
Domestic Bills  0.43     
Foreign Bills  0.15     
Loans 0.13    
Cash Credit  0.08     
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Overall, post bills were the item that correlated the most 
with the note stock. Post bills correlate positively with notes. 
Balance sheet logic implies that, all else equal, an increase in 
the volume of notes should be accompanied by an increase 
in assets, and/or a decrease in other liabilities. Changes in 
the volume of post bills cannot therefore be considered a 
“source” of changes in the volume of notes. The correlation 




side, domestic bills hade the strongest correlation with notes, 
followed by liquid claims.   
 The big months  
Of particular interest is the behaviour of the balance sheet in 
“the big months” when notes expanded or contracted 
sharply. Because notes and post bills expanded and con-
tracted together, they are counted together in this section. 
The greatest expansions of notes and post bills occurred in 
March and in September. The greatest contractions occurred 
in July and in January. Table 3 shows mean and standard 
deviation for monthly changes in (notes + post bills) for the 
period 1880–1895. It also shows mean and standard devia-
tion for changes in balance sheet items, expressed as a ratio 
of the change in (notes + post bills). Bonds and Equity are 
not reported, since they hardly exhibited seasonal varation. 
Ratios for liabilities are defined so that a change in opposite 
direction to the change in (notes + post bills) gives a positive 
sign [thus, for deposits, the ratio is:  – ∆ Deposits / ∆ (Notes + 




Table 3 Mean and standard deviation for the change in (Notes + Post Bills), 
and for ratios of change in balance sheet items and change in (Notes + Post 
bills), in March, July, September and January, 1880–1895.  
March   July  September  January   
Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
Notes + Post Bills  0.076  0.024  –0.085 0.019  0.15  0.040  –0.079  0.015 
Cash  –0.10  0.22 0.18 0.17  –0.01  0.07 0.17  0.27 
Liquid  Claims  –0.27 0.41 –0.08 0.47  0.27  0.22  0.38 0.35 
Domestic  Bills  0.72 0.41 0.41 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.08  0.36 
Foreign  Bills  –0.21 0.12 –0.29 0.26  0.16  0.13  0.40 0.28 
Loans  0.49 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.02 0.06  –0.21    0.24 
Cash  Credit  0.13 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.05 0.08  –0.59  0.39 
Demand  Deposits  0.14 0.36 0.21 0.29 0.16 0.13 0.17  0.15 
Time Deposits  –0.05  0.45  0. 29  0.33  0.13  0.17  0.56  0.43 
Total  0.86 0.53 1.13 0.45 0.93 0.16 0.99  0.40 
Lending  1.35 0.67 0.82 0.34 0.24 0.17  –0.73  0.60 
Deposits  0.09 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.28 0.18 0.75  0.49 
    Note: Ratios for liabilities are defined as:  – ∆ Liability / ∆ (Notes + Post 
Bills).   
The co-movers differed over the year. The note expansion in 
March occurred mainly through an expansion of domestic 
lending – mainly through domestic bills and loans. The con-
traction in July is on the other hand mostly associated with 
an expansion of deposits (but domestic bills are also impor-
tant). The large September expansion is the one where co-
movers are most evenly distributed, with liquid claims, do-
mestic and foreign bills, and demand and time deposits tak-
ing a relatively equal share. The variance of the co-movers is 
also smallest in September. In this month, deposits account 
for about one third of the change in notes. Lending repre-
sents a relatively small factor. The relative role of domestic 




ber, compared to their role in the March expansion. In Janu-
ary, increasing time deposits was the largest factor behind 
the contraction. It is also noteworthy that lending actually 
expands in this month, despite the fact that notes contract 
(loans and cash credit expands, while bills slightly contract).  
Question 3 aked how much of the note expansion was 
due to qualitative changes in money demand, particularly in 
September. Table 3 shows that the role of demand deposits 
was fairly equal in all the big months. Demand deposits ac-
counted for between 14 and 21 percent of the change in 
notes. This figure represents the qualitative, or form-
seasonal, change in money demand, the change in the rela-
tion between currency and demand deposits. The figure may 
be considered low. However, if we include time deposits, 
then about one third of the increase in notes and post bills in 
September was due to a withdrawal of deposits. This quan-
tity could be considered non-negligible, and may explain the 
historic need for erecting institutions able to provide form-
seasonal elasticity to the currency.  
Liquid claims and foreign bills seem to co-move in a pe-
culiar manner. They both contract in March, in spite of notes 
expanding. In July they both expand, in spite of notes con-
tracting. On the other hand they co-move positively with 
notes in September and in January. This pattern of move-
ment should be related to the sailing season. In the winter 
period November–March, exporters were short on foreign 
payments media. The quantities of liquid claims and foreign 
bills therefore decreased in these months. In the sailing sea-
son from May to October, exporters received foreign pay-




commercial banks. Liquid claims and foreign bills therefore 
increased in those months.  
Table 3 contains substantial information on how the En-
skilda banks were able to solve the liquidity problem of the 
Swedish economy in the late 19th century. It provides in-
sights into how the co-movements of notes with other bal-
ance sheet items were dictated by the needs of industry and 
agriculture – needs which depended on conditions for sow-
ing and sailing that were set by nature. In March, when ex-
ports were low, banks extended currency to the industry by 
means of domestic lending. In July, currency demand was at 
its lowest. There was a contraction of notes, associated 
mostly with an increase in deposits. At the same time the 
sailing season made the volume of foreign payment media 
swell. September saw the greatest need for currency. From 
harvest and exports, income flowed into both agriculture 
and industry, and the need for loans was therefore limited. 
Notes were issued with backing from a variety of sources, as 
well as through the withdrawal of deposits.  
5  The co-movers  
This section describes the seasonal changes of the co-movers 
in more detail, as was done with notes in section 2. The fol-
lowing items are covered: post bills, lending (bills, loans and 
cash credit), deposits (time and demand), liquid claims and 
cash.  
Post Bills 
The post bill was a form of cashier’s check that was unique 
to the Swedish payment system. It was invented by André 




Bank, the most important note-issuing bank, which also 
served as a clearinghouse for the banking system. The post 
bill was intentionally invented to facilitate the clearing proc-
ess. The provincial banks held clearing accounts at the 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank. For out-of-town payments, in-
stead of sending notes by registered mail, a person could 
buy a post bill at the Stockholms Enskilda Bank free of 
charge, ordering the Stockholm Enskilda Bank to pay a 
stipulated sum on demand to the payee. The bill was then 
sent by regular mail. The receiver would then cash it, again 
free of charge, at his provincial Enskilda bank, which would 
pay with its own notes. The provincial bank would then 
send the post bill to Stockholms Enskilda Bank, which would 
credit the provincial bank’s clearing account.  
All Swedish banks issued post bills free of charge, which 
were accepted and cashed by all other banks at sight and 
free of charge. This was in contrast to corresponding bills of 
foreign banks, which were payable with eight to ten days 
notice, and bought and sold at a charge. According to 
Wallenberg (1886), the reason was the Enskilda banks’ right 
to issue notes, by which they could pay out with their own 
notes instead of using costly reserves. That the freedom to 
issue notes in this way lowers transaction costs has scarcely 
been noticed in the free banking literature. Wallenberg (1886, 
p. 27) claims that it saved one million crowns per year in 
transaction costs.  
The post bill thus filled an important role in the Swedish 
payments system. Figure 5 shows how the post bills of the 




Figure 5 Post bills of the Enskilda Banks 1878-1901 (kSEK), and 
average monthly circulation, 1880-1895.  
 
 
  ∆  p 
Jan  –0.20  0.000 
Feb  0.16  0.000 
Mar  0.10  0.000 
Apr  0.033  0.21 
May  –0.30  0.000 
Jun  0.069  0.003 
Jul  –0.14  0.000 
Aug  0.019  0.43 
Sep  0.19  0.000 
Oct  –0.046  0.10 
Nov  0.009  0.71 
Dec  0.10  0.000   
    Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Post bills were a highly elastic payment medium. Figure 8 
confirms the strong positive co-movement between notes 
and post bills. Post bills peaked in March–April, June, Sep-
tember and December, and bottomed in July and in January. 
In contrast to notes, they increased also in April (although 
















Bills should be of prime interest as a co-mover of notes. First, 
as Table 1 showed, they were the most important form of 
credit on the balance sheet, accounting for 30 percent of total 
assets in 1890. Second, they were the most liquid form of 
credit. The quantity of domestic bills held by the Enskilda 
banks is shown in Figure 6.  
Figure 6 Domestic bills of Enskilda banks 1878-1901 (kSEK)  
 
 
  ∆  p 
Jan –0.009 0.092 
Feb 0.012  0.000 
Mar 0.024  0.000 
Apr 0.001 0.20 
May –0.004 0.76 
Jun –0.018 0.000 
Jul -0.021  0.000 
Aug –0.013 0.036 
Sep 0.014  0.000 
Oct 0.008  0.007 
Nov 0.002 0.10 
Dec 0.004  0.062   















The volume of bills moved with strong cyclical and seasonal 
regularity. Cyclically, they moved in periods of eight to nine 
years. The movement is so regular that it conveys an impres-
sion of “econo-rhytms” at work. Seasonally, bills surged in 
volume at the beginning of the year, to reach a maximum in 
March–May. They then subsided to reach a low point in Au-
gust, from which they again increased.  
If we look at foreign bills, they moved in seasonal cycles 
with great regularity and amplitude, in a pattern highly dif-




Figure 7 Foreign bills of Enskilda banks, 1878–1901 (kSEK), 
and their seasonal average, 1880–1895  
 
 
  ∆  p 
Jan –0.18  0.000 
Feb –0.18  0.000 
Mar –0.13  0.004 
Apr –0.091 0.001 
May 0.081 0.004 
Jun 0.20  0.000 
Jul 0.12  0.000 
Aug 0.15 0.036 
Sep 0.14  0.004 
Oct 0.099  0.002 
Nov –0.11 0.031 
Dec –0.10  0.003   
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Foreign bills steadily decreased from November until April. 
They then steadily increased between May and October – 
during the sailing season. In May–October shipments were 
made and Swedish exporters received payments in foreign 
bills. These were discounted with the Swedish Enskilda 















foreign bills were hardly presented for discounting with the 
banks, wherefore their holdings fell.   
Loans 
Loans against promissory notes (reverslån) were the tradi-
tional and most common form of credit in Sweden, even be-
tween merchants, before the 1860s, when bills were begin-
ning to be more widely used. In the Summary Reports, loans 
were divided into six categories, namely loans on (security 
in): fixed assets; bonds; stocks; commodities; name security; 
and surety. Of these, loans-on-commodities can be expected 
to correlate most strongly with the “needs of trade”. In fact, 
this form of loan shows a remarkably stable and accentuated 




Figure 8 Loans-on-commodities of the Enskilda banks 1878–
1901 (kSEK), and their seasonal averages, 1880–1895 
 
 
  ∆ p 
Jan 0.080 0.000 
Feb 0.094 0.000 
Mar 0.074 0.000 
Apr –0.015 0.79 
May –0.030 0.59 
Jun –0.077 0.002 
Jul –0.071 0.001 
Aug –0.052 0.049 
Sep –0.049 0.042 
Oct –0.034 0.28 
Nov 0.019 0.21 
Dec 0.059 0.000   
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Interestingly, the seasonal pattern for loans-on-commodities 
is exactly reverse to the one for foreign bills. It is as if loans-
on-commodities are the reverse coin of foreign bills, and the 
seasonal pattern should therefore be related to the sailing 
season. The volume of loans-on-commodities surged steadily 
at the beginning of the year, until it peaked in March. It then 















October, bottoming in this last month. From then it again 
begin to rise. Loans-on-commodities were likely granted to 
export manufacturers, who would repay the loans with for-
eign bills during the sailing season. Thus, loans-on-
commodities seem in a certain sense to be self-liquidating.  
Total loans show a pattern that is similar but not as dis-
tinct as the one for loans-on-commodities. This is seen in 




Figure 9 Total loans of the Enskilda banks 1878-1901 (kSEK),  
and average seasonal total loans, 1881–1895 
 
 
  ∆  p 
Jan 0.005  0.005 
Feb 0.016  0.000 
Mar 0.015  0.000 
Apr 0.0 0.20 
May –0.004 0.83 
Jun –0.009 0.033 
Jul –0.013 0.002 
Aug –0.005 0.32 
Sep –0.001 0.68 
Oct –0.004 0.60 
Nov 0.002 0.27 
Dec –0.002 0.78   
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports 
Total loans also increased at the beginning of the year, peak-
ing in March–May. It then steadily dropped in the second 
half of the year. The changes from August to December are 
















Cash credit  
Cash credit, the third form of lending, shows a similar sea-
sonal variation to loans and bills, in that it increased in the 
first half of the year and decreased in the second half of it. 
This is seen in Figure 10.  
Figure 10 Cash credit lent by Enskilda banks, 1878–1900, (kSEK), 
and seasonal averages, 1880–1895.  
 
 
 ∆  p 
Jan 0.038  0.000 
Feb 0.033  0.000 
Mar 0.002 0.76 
Apr 0.002 0.78 
May –0.022 0.000 
Jun –0.009 0.053 
Jul –0.017 0.000 
Aug 0.0 0.90 
Sep 0.011  0.026 
Oct –0.024 0.000 
Nov –0.017 0.000 
Dec 0.004 0.41   















Again, the volume increased at the beginning of the year, 
peaking in February–April, after which it dropped. Like bills 
but unlike loans, cash credit increased in September, thus 
contributing to the note expansion in this month. It then 
dropped again to bottom in November–December.  
Deposits 
Figure 11 depicts the behaviour of demand deposits.  
Figure 11 Demand deposits of the Enskilda banks, 1878–1901 
(kSEK), and seasonal averages, 1880–1895.  
 
 
  ∆  p 
Jan 0.017  0.064 
Feb 0.041  0.000 
Mar –0.021 0.029 
Apr –0.042 0.000 
May 0.035 0.000 
Jun 0.005 0.32 
Jul 0.019  0.007 
Aug –0.010 0.46 
Sep –0.046 0.000 
Oct 0.018  0.004 
Nov 0.003 0.46 














 Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. 
As expected, demand deposits moved seasonally in a pattern 
that is inversely related to the one for notes. Demand depos-
its decreased when note demand peaked, in March, June, 
September and December. Demand deposits peaked in July, 
when note demand was bottom low. However, a deviation 
occurs in April, when demand deposits decrease when notes 
also decrease. Time deposits are depicted in Figure 12.   
Figure 12 Time deposits of Enskilda banks 1878-1900 (kSEK), 













  ∆  p 
Jan 0.006  0.000 
Feb 0.009  0.000 
Mar –0.003 0.88 
Apr 0.001 0.11 
May –0.002 0.85 
Jun –0.002 0.89 
Jul 0.004  0.013 
Aug –0.0 0.52 
Sep –0.009 0.099 
Oct –0.003 0.91 
Nov 0.002 0.38 
Dec –0.004 0.67   
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. 
Time deposits rapidly took off in 1897. As in the case of de-
mand deposits, the seasonal pattern correlates negatively 
quite well with that for notes. Time deposits decreased when 
notes increased in March, June, September and December. 
Time deposits increased when notes decreased in April and 
July. However, except for the increases in January–February 
and July (and weakly, in April), and the drop in September, 
the changes are not statistically significant.  
Cash and Liquid Claims  
The Summary Reports divide the banks’ cash holdings into 
four categories: Swedish gold coin; other gold; silver, bronze 
and copper coin and Bank of Sweden notes held by the En-
skilda banks; and Enskilda bank notes. Figure 13 shows total 
gold holdings, and total cash (excluding Enskilda banks’ 








Figure 13  Gold and total cash held by the Enskilda banks, 




  ∆  P 
Jan –0.003 0.83 
Feb 0.001  0.  94 
Mar –0.011 0.45 
Apr –0.045 0.010 
May 0.004 0.78 
Jun 0.049  0.000 
Jul –0.044 0.003 
Aug 0.022 0.073 
Sep –0.018 0.23 
Oct –0.022 0.077 
Nov 0.029 0.053 
Dec 0.038  0.038   
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. Total cash includes 
gold, silver, bronze and copper coin and Bank of Sweden 
notes (but not Enskilda bank notes). 
Cash holdings were exceptionally stable. Gold holdings did 
not vary at all. Total cash mostly co-moved negatively with 
notes. Except for the increase in June, cash decreased in 
March and in September–October when notes increased. 















were demanded in those periods, and hence Enskilda cash 
holdings decreased. The cash of the Enskilda banks may be 
contrasted with those of the Bank of Sweden. These are 
shown in Figure 14.   
Figure 14  Gold and coin held by the Bank of Sweden, 1878-
1901 (kSEK) 
 
     Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.   
Three things are noteworthy. First, in contrast to the En-
skilda banks, gold reserves increased from the mid 1890s. 
Second, the pattern changed remarkably from 1890. Up until 
then, gold reserves showed seasonal variability, with a peak 
in March. After 1890 gold reserves became flat with sudden 
discrete jumps. This is a reflection of policy changes. From 
1890, the Bank of Sweden began to use foreign exchange 














Liquid claims are here defined as the Enskilda banks’ hold-
ings of: clearing accounts; accounts at foreign and domestic 
banks; and foreign notes, checks and bills payable at sight. 
Figure 15 shows the Enskilda banks’ holdings of liquid 
claims in 1878–1901, and the seasonal average in 1880–1895.  
Figure 15  Liquid claims of the Enskilda banks 1878–1901, and 
average seasonal liquid claims, 1880–1895.  
 
 
  ∆  p 
Jan –0.07  0.000 
Feb 0.071  0.000 
Mar –0.023 0.23 
Apr –0.079 0.000 
May 0.008 0.34 
Jun 0.067  0.000 
Jul –0.02  0.28 
Aug 0.009 0.45 
Sep 0.066  0.000 
Oct –0.003 0.97 
Nov 0.0 0.85 
Dec –0.026 0.14   

















Liquid claims tended to increase from April to October, but 
tended to decrease during the winter months. They thus 
show similarities to the seasonal movements of foreign bills. 
This is not surprising, since they largely consisted of foreign 
payment media, such as foreign bank accounts, notes, checks 
and bills payable at sight. These items surely moved with the 
sailing season.  
6  Conclusions  
This paper described the workings of the asset currency pro-
vided by the Swedish note banking system, and how it 
solved the liquidity problem of the Swedish economy in the 
late 19th century. Natural and institutional conditions in-
creased the demand for currency particularly in March and 
in September-October, while it bottomed in July and in Janu-
ary. The demand for Bank of Sweden notes was somewhat 
different, peaking in June, September and December, but 
with little demand in March.  
The liquidity needs of industry were to a large extent 
dictated by the sailing season. In the winter season, currency 
was supplied by means of domestic lending. In contrast, 
lending was not needed during the sailing season in May–
October, when exporters received foreign payments media, 
such as foreign bills and liquid claims. These moved in-
versely to lending, decreasing in the winter season and in-
creasing in spring and summer. In particular, loans-on-
commodities seem to have communicated perfectly with 
foreign bills, suggesting that the former might be self-
liquidating.  
Overall, domestic bills were the most important instru-




elasticity to currency needs than did the other forms of lend-
ing. Deposits were particularly important in September, 
where they accounted for about one third of the note supply, 
and in the contraction months in July and in January. The 
role of demand deposits for note supply was fairly stable 
over the year, accounting for about 14–21 percent of the 
change in notes in the “big months”. This figure represents 
the qualitative change in money demand. The month of Sep-
tember saw the greatest demand for notes, and a mixture of 
agricultural, industrial and institutional needs saw the notes 
supplied from a variety of sources, with liquid claims, do-
mestic and foreign bills, and demand and time deposits con-
tributing roughly equally to the expansion of notes. In this 
month, withdrawal of deposits accounted for about a third 
of the expansion of notes. This figure does not seem trivial, 
and helps to understand the historic need for institutions 
able to provide “form-seasonality ” to rigid currencies.  
The general impression of this study is that the Swedish 
note banking system was able to provide an elastic currency 
that responded well to the seasonal “needs of trade”. The 
seasonal demand varied with utmost regularity, and the bal-
ance sheet of the Enskilda banks worked like a clockwork to 
meet it, where various items contributed at different times of 
the year. The unrestricted discretion of the Enskilda banks to 
use a variety of assets with which to back their notes was 
surely necessary to accommodate the seasonal needs. The 
result of this study complements that of Ögren (2003) who 
concludes that the note-issuing activity of the Enskilda banks 
was crucial in providing liquidity to the Swedish capital 
market in the late 19th century. The experience of the asset 




dicates that central banks-lenders of last resort were not 
strictly needed to solve the liquidity problems that haunted 
economies in the late 19th century.  
It could be worthwhile to compare the liquidity provi-
sion in Sweden with those of the other Nordic countries. 
External conditions were similar. The Scandinavian coun-
tries were also joined in a currency union. However, the 
other Nordic countries had central banks that enjoyed note 
monopoly. Were the other Nordic countries as effective in 
solving the liquidity problems of the late 19th century as was 
the Swedish note banking system? This should be an inter-
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Specifications of regressions and calculations of seasonal 
components.   
 
The following model was estimated for stationary balance 
sheet items (here notes):  
u Dec Feb Notes Log + + + + = 11 1 0 ... β β β ,       
 (A1) 
where  
t t t t t t u u u u u ε + + + + = − − − − 4 3 2 1 .          
 (A2) 
 
The constant β0 , representing January was normalised to 0. 
A value vi for each month i  was then calculated as  
i i v β + = 1 .               
 (A3) 
The seasonal component si for each month was then calcu-
lated as  






j i i v v s .           
 (A4) 
For differenced balance sheet items (such as Bills), the re-




u Dec Feb Jan Bills Log + + + + = ∆ 11 1 0 ... β β β .     
 (A5) 
A value for each month vi was then calculated as 









j i i v
v
β β
    .          
 (A6) 
The seasonal component si was then calculated as 




1 j i i v v s .            
 (A7)  
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